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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a novel measure of universal banking constructed 
using the relative contribution of each operating segment to total assets. 
Using a sample of international banks, we evaluate the extent to which our 
proposed metric affects banks’ profitability, stability, liquidity and 
capitalisation. In addition, we evaluate the implications of a more complex 
business model, featured by the interaction of universal banking and 
globalization. Results suggest that a higher degree of diversification 
enhances financial stability and capitalisation when the Universal Banking 
Index (UBI) is used as a proxy of universal banking. However, a more 
complex structure, conceived as the combination of universal and global 
business models, is associated with lower levels of capital and is less 
desirable from a financial stability perspective.  
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I. INTRODUCTION   
 
The implications of a universal banking model have recently been in the spotlight of 
regulatory discussions as some countries are underway to adopt structural banking reforms. 
Some scholars have warned about potential unintended side-effects resulting from a regulatory-
induced reduction in the latitude of banks’ operations. Structural banking reforms may, indeed, 
result in economic slowdown, high financing and implementation costs and stimulation in the 
growth of shadow banking (Goodhart 2012; Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson 2012; Duffie, 
2012; Thakor 2012; and Blundell-Wignall et al., 2013). Moreover, some seminal contributions 
suggest that limiting the degree of universal banking could result in lower economies of scopes, 
restricting banks’ ability to take full advantage of their information gathering and monitoring 
for an efficient provision of financial services (Rajan, 1992; Saunders and Walters, 1994 and 
Stein, 2002).  
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On the other hand, other scholars set forth several rationales which may justify such 
reforms. For instance, Hakenes and Schnabel (2014) find a moral hazard effect arising from 
banks engaging in riskier activities when a deposit insurance system is in place. Also, agency 
problems could be magnified in universal banking models as insiders have higher incentives to 
extract private benefits (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Rotemberg and Saloner 1994).  A number 
of contributions further argue that diversification of financial products provision does not 
enhance banks’ valuation and performance (Elsas et al., 2010; Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger 
and Ofek (1995) and Denis et al. (1997). Most notably, Laeven and Levin (2007) find a 
negative relationship between diversification of financial firms’ activity and market value, 
attributable to agency costs and limited economies of scope. 
Portfolio theory literature suggests that diversification in banking activities decreases 
overall risk exposure due to the imperfect correlations among different business segments 
(among many: Markowitz, 1952; Lewellen, 1971). A large strand of the literature proposes a 
number of theoretical models analysing the implications of diversification in banking on risk 
stressing the conditions under which it is desirable. Earlier research suggests that the benefits 
arising from diversification in banking are mainly due to risk spreading across assets and 
sectors (see Berger, et al., 1999, for a survey). For instance, Diamond (1984) shows that full 
diversification of activities is optimal when delegated monitoring is in place and that 
diversification of the assets portfolio reduces the probability of default of a bank1. Winton 
(1999) show that diversification is more desirable for those institutions which take a medium 
level of risk by means of a model in which gains from activities diversification are a function 
of the riskiness of the bank. More recent, post-crisis seminal contributions have, however, 
questioned the desirability of banking diversification across banks within the banking system.  
For instance, Stiglitz (2010) argues that the risk of systemic contagion increases when a 
banking system is characterised by banks that have well-diversified assets, such as universal 
banks, as opposite to specialised banks. When diversification strategies are correlated across 
institutions, common macroeconomic shocks may affect all banks at the same time. This 
mechanism of shock contagion is further exacerbated in the event of fire-sales of common 
assets holdings (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011). 
In the empirical literature universal banking is usually proxied by noninterest income-
based ratios. Financial intermediaries receive noninterest income principally from 
commissions on new securities issued, derivative contracts and hedge funds and private equity 
activities. Empirical evidence using noninterest income as proxy for universal banking seems 
to support the view that this business model triggers financial instabilities. Stiroh (2004) and 
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Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) show that noninterest income is positively related to 
banking risk using US and a panel of international banks respectively. Moreover, Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find a nonlinear relationship between risk diversification and 
universal banking model, which decreases at low levels of noninterest income. Gambacorta 
and van Rixtel (2013) also find a nonlinear relationship between noninterest income and bank 
profitability. Brunnermeier et al (2012) using data for all US commercial banks find that non-
interest income to interest income ratio is associated with higher systemic risk.  This latter 
finding confirms previous arguments put forward by Wagner (2010) who also finds that 
banking diversification reduces the risk of default at bank level. One notable exception to this 
strand of evidence is advanced by Dietrich and Vollmer (2012) who find that the universal 
banking business model in Germany, proxied by the share of net commission income to total 
net revenue, helped mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis. 
In this paper we argue that noninterest income is a poor indicator of universal banking 
as it does not reflect the true degree of diversification of activities. Indeed noninterest income 
does not take into account the mixture and cardinality of activity provisions as it bundles all 
noninterest income generating activities together. We question here whether there is a 
measurement bias in universal banking modelling as there may be some diversification benefits 
that stem from universal banking that are not captured by noninterest income proxies. Multi-
divisional and diversified business models could benefit indeed from internal capital markets 
that allow liquidity and capital to flow between operating units (Ashcraft, 2006). Also, as argued 
by Boot and Schmeits (2000) these business models enhance resiliency of banks due to the 
implicit co-insurance amongst segments. Diversification in operating units also allows eventual 
losses to be shared among a number of operating segments, easing the pressure on the retail 
division and containing intra-group contagion. For this reason, from a regulatory point of view, 
knowing the relative weight of each operating segment in a bank’s business model can yield 
fundamental predictions on the pressure on the retail segment and the potential burden on the 
taxpayer.  
We propose an entropy-based measure of diversification that takes into account the 
mixture and cardinality of relevant operating segments of banks, namely the Universal Banking 
Index (UBI). Ideally, to account precisely for the true degree of universal banking, intended as 
the provision of a wide range of financial products and services, one would need segmented 
data on either assets, revenues or income by type of products and services provision (Laeven 
and Levine, 2007). However, segmented data on the type and volume of financial assets 
provisions by banks is not available. Our measure can, then, be considered as a broad proxy of 
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universal banking to the extent to which it captures the number and size of substantial operating 
segments which in turn, reflect the specialisation in a given financial product/service provision.  
The UBI is constructed at the macro level for 21 countries and at the micro level for 
102 banks. A dynamic panel model is then used for bank-level data with a twofold objective. 
First, we assess the extent to which a universal banking model, as measured by the UBI, relates 
to banking profitability, stability, liquidity and capitalisation. The share of noninterest income 
to total income is also considered in the several specifications to allow for a comparative 
analysis. Secondly, we test how a complex business model, featuring both financial products 
provision diversification and globalization, relates to banking profitability, stability, liquidity 
and capitalisation. This allows to capture the geographical diversification feature which applies 
to many banks in our sample and to account for the fact that banks that are both universal and 
global may have different risk exposures than banks that are universal only.  As argued by 
Calomiris and Mason (2000) and Carlson (2004), geographical diversification in banking is 
associated with a higher probability of default as it stimulates banks to hold less reserves and 
to limit their portfolio diversification.  
This paper contributes to the financial intermediation literature in two ways. Firstly, it 
presents a novel metric for measuring universal banking and an accompanying database with 
both a country- and bank-level dimension. Secondly, this paper provides a joint analysis of the 
degree of diversification in financial products provisions and globalization of a banking sector 
and their relationship with key banking features, i.e. profitability and risk, whereas existing 
literature focuses on the former exclusively.  
Results indicate that a universal banking model increases financial stability when our 
entropy-based measure is used. Statistical support is very limited when using the noninterest 
income proxy to measure universal banking which instead points towards a negative 
relationship between financial stability and universal banking.  When a more complex business 
model is considered, that is, a universal banking model with a global reach component, the 
latter relationship does not longer hold. Furthermore, a higher UBI corresponds to banks being 
more profitable, liquid and well capitalised while more complex business models are less liquid 
and less capitalised.  
This paper is structured as follows: Section II introduces the entropy-based measure of 
universal banking with related stylised facts. Section III describes the data and the 
methodological approach and Section IV the empirical results. Section V concludes.  
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II. Evaluating the extent of universal business model: UBI 
II.I The Universal banking model: On its measurement 
The universal banking model is a key characterising feature of modern banks in 
response to a deregulated and highly competitive environment. It refers to the diversification 
of financial products and services offered by banks, translating in a shift away from traditional 
banking (i.e. deposit-taking and loan-issuing) towards the provision of insurance, securities 
and pension products as well as investment banking and other financial services (Saunders and 
Walter, 1994, Casu et al., 2015, Laeven and Levine 2007). The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
has brought about a renewed interest in the implications of this type of business model common 
to global systemically important institutions (G-SIFI), whose regulation is at the core of 
structural banking reforms in the US, UK and the Euro area (Volkers, Vickers and Liikanen 
proposals). The degree of universal banking is typically measured by the relative share of 
noninterest income to total income and, when available, by its components, i.e. investment 
banking fees and commission income, fiduciary activity income, trading revenue, insurance 
activities revenue, securitisation income1. One notable exception to noninterest income-based 
measures of universal banking is found in the seminal paper by Laeven and Levine (2007) in 
which the authors provide an asset-based measure of banking diversification. Their proposed 
diversity index captures the degree of diversification of banking activities, which takes the 
value between 0 and 1 with values closer to 1 imply higher diversification, intended as a 
mixture of lending and non-lending activities. This is calculated as the difference between net 
loans and other earning assets as a share of total earning assets. 
Noninterest income-based proxies for universal banking should be interpreted with 
caution as while they capture the relative share of income generated from non-traditional 
banking, they do not reflect the actual overall diversification in financial products provision. 
Two banks with similar noninterest income may, indeed, have very different universal business 
model configurations as one institution might be generating all its noninterest income from one 
business segment, say investment banking, and the other from a more diversified business 
model with several operating segments.  
A proxy of universal banking that captures the actual diversification of activities can 
improve our understanding of the risk inherent to a particular financial intermediary for a 
                                                          
1 A similar caveat arises when considering components of noninterest income as share of total income as these 
reflect the contribution to total income of a particular activity in isolation rather than in relation to the rest of the 
business model. 
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number of reasons. Diversification in product provision and in operating units may better shield 
a bank from idiosyncratic shocks. Indeed, the impact at the division-level of intra-group 
contagion in a bank having many established specialised operating segments is likely to be 
relatively more contained than in intermediaries with only a few divisions. Internal capital 
markets might help banks smooth out the impact of an adverse shock in one segment, 
improving the overall resilience of a bank2,3. Additionally, understanding the heterogeneity in 
diversified business models across banks may be of particular interest for macro-prudential 
regulators for systemic risk assessment purposes. As argued by Haldane and May (2011), a 
financial system characterised by financial institutions featuring wide-ranging and well-
diversified business models are more stable and protected from systemic contagion. 
Furthermore, as theoretically shown by Boot and Schmeits (2000), there is a diversification 
effect of co-insurance in banks constituted by many divisions suppling differentiated products 
which results in reduced risk-taking, probability of default and funding costs.  
There are also some practical challenges associated with the use of noninterest income-
based proxies of universal banking. Most notably, the observed volatility of this measure is 
often due to its inherent pro-cyclicality rather than a structural re-dimensioning in banks’ 
operations. Also, interpretational challenges arise when noninterest income is negative as 
witnessed in 2008 and 2009 for a number of banks, such as Citigroup (US), Imperial bank 
(Canada), Landesbank (Germany), KBC (Belgium). 
 
II.II The Universal banking model: The Universal Banking Index (UBI) 
We propose an entropy-based measure of diversification in operating segments based 
on balance sheet segmented assets data4, namely the Universal Banking Index (UBI). This 
metric can better capture the business model of a bank as it reflects the number and the 
magnitude of specialised operating segments at once. Bank level data is obtained from 
Bloomberg where banking assets are segmented by business units. An operating segment is 
considered as such whenever it contributes to at least 10% of total consolidated revenue of the 
bank. The unbalanced panel spans over the period 2001-2015 and has an annual frequency. 
Table 1A in the appendix reports the banks included in the sample for a total of 102 banks 
                                                          
2 See for instance Gambacorta (2005) for a discussion on bank subsidiaries. 
3 Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) show that internal capital markets are used by global banks to reallocate 
liquidity across the borders. 
4 Whenever segmented data is unavailable for total assets, segmentation by revenue is used. For only a few banks, 
segmentation by total income is used. See Table 2.A for details.   
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headquartered in 21 countries. The sample of banks considered includes all those institutions 
for which segmented balance sheet data is available at any point during the sample period 
considered. These banks are typically the largest banks in each country. The metric is based on 
the Shannon entropy measure of economic diversification, with its roots in geographical 
economics (Hackbart and Anderson, 1975) and commonly used in industrial economics. The 
entropy measure of economic diversification is defined as: 
𝐷(?̂?) = − ∑ 𝑦𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1                    (1) 
 
Where: 
i= 1, ..., N are basic units; yi are the relative share of unit i of a random variable Y, for which 
𝑦𝑖 =
𝑌𝑖
𝑌
 and ?̂? = (𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑁); Y is a random variable which is observed for each i such as 
Y=∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 . The diversification measure 𝐷(?̂?) lays between 0 and lnN (0 < 𝐷(?̂?) < ln 𝑁) as 
when yi=1 there is no diversification and 𝐷(?̂?) = 0; when, instead, all basic units have the 
same relative share, i.e. 𝑦1 = 𝑦2 = ⋯ =  𝑦𝑁 =
1
𝑁
, then 𝐷(?̂?) = log 𝑁.  
The entropy-based UBI is obtained by applying the following formula to bank-level 
data:  
𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑖(?̂?𝑖,𝑏) = − ∑ 𝑎𝑖,𝑏 ln 𝑎𝑖,𝑏
𝐵
𝑏=1      (2) 
Where i, i=1,…, I are banks, b, b=1, ..., B, are operating segments and ai,b is the relative 
share of assets of bank i in operating unit b.  
Figure 1 shows the relationship between noninterest income as a share of total income 
and UBI for those banks with the highest noninterest income in 2015. As it can be noticed, 
banks with similar noninterest income to total income, i.e. higher than 0.8, have very diverse 
diversification of operating units, as suggested by the UBI. Most notably, banks such as 
Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and UBS, albeit having high noninterest income shares, do 
not feature business models which are as diversified as Nomura, Macquaire and UBS. Morgan 
Stanley, for instance, has almost 90% of its income generated from non-traditional banking 
activities, most of which is generated from its institutional securities activities operations alone. 
In a similar fashion, State Street generates more than 80% of its income from non-traditional 
banking but this is concentrated mainly in investment servicing. On the contrary, for a similar 
level of noninterest income share Macquire Bank has a much more diversified business model. 
This bank, indeed, features several divisions such as commodities and financial markets, 
banking and financial services, securities operations, corporate and asset finance, asset 
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management and real estate banking, reflecting product provision specialisation in each of 
these activities.  
At the other end of the spectrum, there are banks with lower noninterest income share 
and high UBI. This is the case, for instance, for Commerzbank with a noninterest income share 
equal to 0.462 as of 2010 but a well-diversified range of operating segments specialising 
respectively in corporates and markets, asset based finance, corporate banking, private and 
business customers. Also, Lloyds Banking Group has a similar business model, which is well 
diversified having divisions such UK retail banking, wholesale and international banking, 
insurance, consumer finance, life pension, asset management and wealth asset finance, but a 
noninterest income share equal to 0.4 as of 2014. Although these banks have a relatively low 
noninterest income, they provide a wide range of services most of which generating interest 
income. This shows that there are some banks that have some degree of diversification mostly 
within the interest generating activities and this is disregarded by looking at noninterest income 
alone. 
Figure 1. Noninterest income share and UBI 
 
Sources: Authors’ computations based on data obtained from Bloomberg. 
Notes: Noninterest income is calculated as the share of noninterest income to total income in 2015. 
 
A general tendency is thus observed when comparing the UBI and noninterest income-
to-total income: the UBI tends to be lower for those institutions with high noninterest income, 
as shown in Figure 1, and vice versa. This evidence reflects how functional differences across 
institutions stand with respect to product provision diversification. The observed dichotomy 
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can be explained by the fact that diversification in financial products provision has concerned 
primarily banks with a traditional history in commercial banking that have subsequently started 
offering other services, such as investment banking and asset management. On the other hand, 
the diversification observed for established investment banks and asset management firms has 
been mostly confined to the provision of either asset management services (for investment 
banks) or investment banking services (for asset management firms). The compiling of a 
classification of banks by their core function is, however, here prevented by data limitation. 
This is due to the fact that for some banks several activities are bundled into one division, 
making it difficult to disentangle functional differences. Leaven and Levine (2007) also 
highlight the difficulties of differentiating between commercial and investment banks due to 
the fact that these institutions engage in a variety of similar activities.  
Figure 2 confirms this trend, showing the relationship between UBI and noninterest 
income to total income for the US banks case. The overall negative relationship between these 
two measures suggests that there is a tendency for US banks with the highest levels of 
noninterest income shares to have a relatively less diversified business model than banks with 
lower noninterest income share. That is, banks that have a higher noninterest income share tend 
to be less diversified and depict a lower degree of universal banking, as measured by the UBI. 
 
Figure 2: US banks- relationship between UBI and noninterest income to total income 
 
Sources: Authors’ computations based on data obtained from Bloomberg. 
Notes: Each point refers to the relationship between UBI and noninterest income share of US banks in the sample in available years over the 
2001-2015 period. 
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The largest banks do not necessarily have a well-diversified business model: among the 
top-20 banks by UBI only six are G-SIFI. Instead, the group of banks with the most diversified 
business model feature large non-G-SIFI with assets in excess of $100bn which depict an 
average UBI equal to 0.42 in contrast to an average G-SIFI UBI of 0.39. G-SIFI, on the other 
hand, depict a higher noninterest income share equal to 0.56 on average compared to an average 
of 0.46 of large non-G-SIFI. Overall, smaller banks in the sample with assets below $100bn 
still have high levels of noninterest income share, equal to around 0.45, but relatively lower 
UBI. 
Table 1 below reports the UBI average values for banks classified by their degree of 
globalization, wholesale funding and leverage, as preliminary assessment of how our metric 
behaves in relation to other business model features. There is an overall negative relationship 
between diversification of banking activities and globalization, as measured by the ratio of 
foreign assets to total consolidated assets. This suggests a trade-off between geographical 
diversification and diversification in financial services provision. More diversified banks seem 
to rely more on wholesale funding, as shown in the middle panel of Table 1, this may be due 
to the fact that these institutions tend to have a lower deposit base arising naturally from the 
more limited scope of their retail operations. Lastly, there is no clear cut-evidence linking 
leverage and diversification. Indeed, on average, banks with either a very low, i.e. below 10, 
or very high, i.e. above 25, assets-to-equity ratio tend to be relatively more diversified. 
Table 1. UBI and other business model features 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign assets UBI Wholesale  funding UBI Leverage UBI
[0, 0.2) 0.435 [0, 20) 0.279 [5, 10) 0.485
[0.2, 0.4) 0.424 [20, 40) 0.344 [10, 15) 0.326
[0.4, 0.6) 0.390 [40, 60) 0.390 [15, 20) 0.391
[0.6, 0.8) 0.219 [60, 80) 0.433 [20, 25) 0.354
[0.8, 1) 0.240 [80, 100) 0.479 [25, 30) 0.447
Notes: The above table reports the average values of UBI by variable tabulation using 2014 data on 101 banks. Foreign 
assets are computed by the share of non-domestic assets to total assets; wholesale funding is equal to non-deposit 
liabilities to total assets and leverage is calculated as the ratio of assets to equity.
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II.III A country-level UBI 
A bottom-up approach allows to obtain a country-level measure of the degree of 
diversification in the provision of financial services, averaging micro data of banks 
headquartered in any given country. Table 2 reports the UBI rankings by country and by banks 
over the sample 2005-2015. The UBI is higher in Sweden and Australia, two countries in which 
banking systems feature a relatively limited geographical diversification. Many European 
countries, such as Greece, UK, France, Italy and Ireland have high average levels of UBI. 
Banking systems in the US, other European countries, Canada and Japan depict comparatively 
less universal business models. This trend is reflected in the bank-level UBI metrics reported 
in the second and third columns of Table 2 referring to the top and bottom rankings of UBI 
respectively. Two Australian banks, Commonwealth Bank and Macquire Bank, have the 
highest degree of diversification followed by three European banks: Eurobank (Greece), 
Unicredit (Italy) and Commerzbank (Germany). BNP Paribas, Lloyds and Bancorp are the 
most diversified banks in terms of financial products provisions as measured by the UBI in 
France, the UK and the US respectively. Morgan Stanley and State Street are the two US banks 
with the lowest UBI. Four Japanese banks are among the institutions with less diversified 
business models; in particular, Yokohoma, Chiba and Shinkin banks depict UBI values less 
than 0.02.  
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Table 2. UBI rankings by country and by banks, averages 
Sources: Authors’ computations based on data obtained from Bloomberg. 
Notes: UBI for each country is calculating by averaging UBI for all banks available in the sample. UBI for each bank refers to the 2005-2015 
averages for each institution. 
 
Figure 1.A in the Appendix reports the time series dynamics of UBI for selected 
countries. Some countries such as the US and Australia depict a relatively stable UBI over the 
whole 2005-2015 period. The 2007-2009 crisis period has witnessed a reduction of the degree 
of universal banking in many countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland. On the other hand, in the UK, US, Japan and 
Australia the UBI has kept relatively steady over this period. Only in a few countries such as 
France, Greece and Sweden there has been a slight increase in the UBI during the GCF. The 
European Sovereign Crisis (ESC) has brought about a reduction or a freeze in the UBI 
especially in Greece, Ireland and Italy. Towards the sample-end UBI has picked up particularly 
for the UK, depicting its historical high.  
  
Country UBI Bank Top UBI ranking Bank Bottom UBI ranking
Sweden 0.510 Commonwealth bank 0.718 Deutsche bank 0.215
Australia 0.472 Macquaire 0.717 Santander 0.209
Greece 0.471 Eurobank 0.691 Heta 0.163
UK 0.467 Unicredit 0.682 Morgan Stanley 0.159
France 0.465 JP Morgan Chase 0.660 Immofinanz 0.145
Italy 0.449 Commerzbank 0.640 Julius Baer 0.109
Ireland 0.449 Bancorp 0.640 Mizuho 0.084
US 0.384 BNP Paribas 0.637 Alandsbanken 0.075
Germany 0.382 Lloyds 0.632 Kontrollbank 0.075
Canada 0.368 Immigon 0.630 KBC 0.071
Portugal 0.365 Bank of America 0.623 Erste 0.065
Netherlands 0.322 RBS 0.623 Canadian Western 0.064
Belgium 0.318 Credit Agricole 0.601 State Street 0.048
Spain 0.315 Banca Popolare Romagna 0.594 Yokohoma 0.017
Austria 0.298 PNC 0.585 Liberbank 0.015
Japan 0.275 Banco Popolare Milano 0.575 Queensland 0.011
Finland 0.272 Swedbank 0.561 Chiba 0.011
Switzerland 0.265 Nomura 0.560 Shinkin 0.004
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III. Data and Methodology 
The empirical methodology presented in this paper has a twofold objective. First, the 
aim is to assess the relative performance of the UBI versus noninterest income as a share of 
total income (NonInterest) with respect to bank profitability, stability, liquidity and capital. 
Secondly, the implications of a more complex banking configuration are investigated, 
encompassing a universal business model (as measured by the UBI) with a global reach 
component. Uneven and limited data availability on the locational composition of banks’ assets 
prevents the construction of an equivalent entropy-based measure of geographical 
diversification at the bank-level. Ratio of foreign assets to total assets, namely foreign 
activities, are then used to proxy for the relative importance of foreign activities of banks.  
A number of proxies are used to account for profitability, stability, liquidity and capital. Return 
on assets (roa) and return on common equity (roe) proxy for bank profitability; the  z-score5 
(z-score), log of nonperforming assets (lnpa) and the ratio of nonperforming assets to total 
assets (npa_ta) proxy for bank stability; wholesale funding share (wholesale) defined as the 
ratio of non-deposit liabilities to total assets and loans to deposit ratio (ldratio) proxy for bank 
liquidity; lastly, two measures of capital ratios are considered: tier1 risk-based capital ratio 
(tier1) and total risk-based capital ratios (rbc). Other control variables are considered in the 
regressions such as the log of total assets (size), net interest margins (nim), the log of total loans 
(loans), leverage (leverage) computed as the assets to equity ratio, deposits-to-assets ratio 
(deposits) and GDP growth rates (ΔGDP).  
The variables are obtained from Bloomberg on an annual basis. The final unbalanced 
dataset includes 102 banks from 21 countries over the years 2001-2015. Table 1.A reports the 
list of banks used in the estimation and Table 3.A the summary statistics of the variables used 
in the regression. The banks comprising the sample are those institutions for which assets 
segmentation by operating unit data is available on Bloomberg enabling the construction of the 
UBI; these institutions are typically the largest listed banks in each country. Banks included in 
the sample are all diversified, albeit to different degrees. Data limitation prevents from 
disentangling banks that do not disclose segmented data from multi-division banks. Therefore, 
the empirical results are conditional on the bank being diversified.  
                                                          
5 Following Altunbas et al. (2011), Boyd and Runkle (1993) and Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), the z-score 
is calculated as the ratio of the return on assets plus the common capital ratio to the standard deviation of the 
return on assets over the available sample for each bank. The highest the z-score the further away a bank is from 
default.  
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The first set of regressions estimated have the intent of evaluating the relative impact 
of both UBI and noninterest income on the banking proxies of interest. The panel regressions 
have the following forms: 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡Φ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                            (3) 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡Φ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡             (4) 
 
Yit is a vector of dependent variables containing different proxies for banking 
profitability, stability, liquidity and capital for bank i, i=1,…,102. UBIit is our measure of 
universal banking and NonInterestit is the traditional measures of universal banking, entering 
regressions (3) and (4) respectively. Xit contains control variables and γi is the bank specific 
unobserved fixed effect.  
Regression (5) below accounts for foreign activities of banks as well as the product of 
foreign activities and UBI. This latter interaction variable allows for an assessment of the 
implication of both a universal and global business model. 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 +  𝛽0,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡Φ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                (5) 
 
The above regression are estimated via a two-step first difference Generalized Method 
of Moment (GMM) estimation technique as pioneered by Arellano and Bond (1991). This 
econometric methodology eliminates the fixed effect by first differencing (3), (4) and (5) and 
corrects for endogeneity among variables by using as instruments lagged differences of the 
dependent variable. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
Tables 3 and 4 report the results of estimates of (3) and (4).  
Table 3 reports the regression estimates where profitability and financial stability 
proxies are used as dependent variables. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7) and (9) consider the UBI as 
universal banking proxy (regression (3)) while columns (2), (4), (6), (8), and (10) use 
noninterest income share as proxy of universal banking (regression (4)).  
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With regards to profitability, it is found that banks with higher UBI tend to be more 
profitable, as reported in columns (1) and (3). That applies to both proxies for profitability, 
namely returns on assets (roa) and returns on common equity (roe) which have positive and 
strongly significant coefficients. Limited evidence is found in support of a positive relationship 
between noninterest income share and profitability. The estimated coefficient of NonInterest is 
positive and significant only in column (4) where roe is used as proxy for profitability. These 
results are overall in line with findings by Elsas et al. (2010) who find a positive relationship 
between activities diversification and profitability of banks.  
The regressions in columns (5)-(10) suggest that a higher UBI enhances financial 
stability while noninterest income share has either an adverse or no effect on financial stability. 
The estimated coefficient associated with the UBI is positive and statistically significant in 
column (5), implying that banks that have a more diversified business model are less likely to 
default. A more diversified business model as measured by the UBI is also associated with 
lower nonperforming assets, as reported in columns (7) and (9). In contrast, the estimated 
coefficient of NonInterest is not significant in the regressions in which z-score and lnpa are 
dependent variables. It is, however, marginally significant and positive in the regression in 
which financial stability is measure by npa_ta, implying that as the share of noninterest income 
increases, nonperforming assets as a share of total assets increase.  
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Table 3: UBI versus noninterest income - profitability and stability regressions 
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Table 4 reports the regression estimates where liquidity and capitalization proxies are 
used as dependent variables.  
Estimates in columns (1) and (2) suggest that an increase of both proxies of universal 
banking are associated with higher liquidity when this is proxied by loan-to-deposit ratio, 
depicting negative and significant coefficients. In contrast, the two proxies do not seem to have 
predicting power in explaining wholesale funding liquidity in columns (3) and (4).  
With regards to capitalization, our regression estimates suggest that banks featuring a 
higher degree of UBI are better capitalized than those institutions with lower activities 
diversification. The UBI indeed enters with a positive and strongly significant coefficient in 
the regressions in which tier 1 capital and total risk based capital ratios are used as dependent 
variables in columns (5) and (7). In columns (6) and (8), where NonInterest is used as proxy of 
universal banking, however, the negative and significant estimated coefficients indicate that 
higher noninterest income is associated with lower capital ratios.  
The control variables in Tables 3 and 4 have overall the expected signs. For instance, 
return on assets has a positive impact on financial stability, as reported in columns (5)-(10) in 
Table 3. The risk-based capital ratio has positive and significant coefficients in columns (5) 
and (6) in Table 3 implying that well capitalized banks are less likely to default. The negative 
and significant coefficient of GDP growth in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 can be explained 
by the pro-cyclicality of risk taking behavior by banks as well documented in the literature (see 
Adrian and Shin, 2010). The negative and significant coefficients of GDP growth in columns 
(9) and (10) in Table 3 also have the expected sign as economic booms are typically associated 
with lower nonperforming assets. Lastly, as suggested by the estimated coefficients of size, 
larger institutions are associated with higher nonperforming assets (columns (7) and (8), Table 
3) and lower liquidity (columns (1) and (2), Table 4). 
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Table 4: UBI versus noninterest income - liquidity and capitalization regressions 
 
 
Table 5 reports the regression estimates of (5) which includes the interaction variable 
between UBI and foreign activities, namely UBI*foreign. As discussed previously, this latter 
aims to capture a more complex business model adopted by some banks in our sample, 
featuring both universal banking and globalization.  
Results suggest that a higher degree of complexity is associated with heightened financial 
fragility. Indeed, the estimated coefficients of UBI*foreign in columns (3) and (4) suggest that 
greater complexity is associated with a higher probability of default and a greater proportion 
of non-performing assets, respectively. Although this complex business model is associated 
with a significant and positive return on assets (column (1)), it depicts lower liquidity and lower 
tier 1 capital ratio. The estimated coefficient of UBI*foreign in column (1) is indeed positive 
and strongly significant, while it is negative and strongly significant in column (8).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged Dependent
1.247*** 
(0.019)
0.836*** 
(0.004)
0.613***  
(0.056)
0.3561***  
(0.103)
0.142*** 
(0.002)
0.152*** 
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0.328***  
(0.053)
0.380***  
(0.032)
NonInterest -
-0.101***  
(0.005)
- 
-1.013  
(1.019)
-
-1.495***  
(0.178)
-
-1.807***  
(0.229)
UBI
-0.507***  
(0.074)
-
7.656  
(5.289)
-
6.380**  
(3.182)
-
8.983***  
(3.544)
-
foreign activities
1.583***  
(0.162)
2.168***  
(0.102)
-5.183  
(3.174)
-1.047  
(4.658)
4.305**  
(1.976)
6.913***  
(0.728)
0.665  
(1.565)
6.441***   
(1.244)
roa
-0.140***  
(0.016)
-0.148***  
(0.009)
-0.923***  
(0.291)
-2.227***  
(0.731)
2.647***  
(0.320)
2.038***  
(0.101)
0.539  
(0.343)
0.635*** 
(0.070)
leverage
-0.003***  
(0.000)
-0.002***  
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-0.004  
(0.006)
0 .000   
(0.019)
-0.009  
(0.010)
0.001  
(0.002)
0.041**  
(0.018)
0.007**  
(0.003)
rbc
0.010***  
(0.003)
0.001  
(0.002)
-0.828***  
(0.133)
-1.320***  
(0.229)
- - - -
nim
-0.027  
(0.019)
0.003  
(0.014)
0.823  
(0.917)
-0.014  
(1.758)
-2.023*** 
(0.312)
-2.314***  
(0.178)
-0.268  
(0.516)
-0.455**   
(0.206)
size
0.037***  
(0.010)
0.036***  
(0.013)
0.368  
(0.357)
0.181   
(0.322)
0.090  
(0.092)
0.138**  
(0.066)
-0.108  
(0.319)
-0.119   
(0.164)
lnpa
-0.128***  
(0.012)
-0.129***  
(0.007)
0.183  
(0.530)
-0.605  
(0.954)
2.397***  
(0.470)
1.745***  
(0.131)
1.576***  
(0.443)
1.543***   
(0.069)
loans - -
0.935   
(1.397)
4.446**  
(2.297)
-1.900** 
(0.779)
-1.410***  
(0.014)
0.530  
(0.859)
-1.647***   
(0.243)
deposits - - - -
0.138***  
(0.035)
0.148***  
(0.014)
0.130***  
(0.029)
0.126*** 
(0.015)
ΔGDP
-0.024***  
(0.002)
-0.019***  
(0.001)
0.002  
(0.089)
0.091   
(0.186)
-0.098  
(0.093)
-0.152***  
(0.035)
0.150  
(0.112)
0.157***  
(0.026)
Observations 498 513 395 409 389 403 381 403
J-Statistics, p-value 0.401 0.39 0.395 0.365 0.267 0.406 0.153 0.434
AR(2) test p-value 0.356 0.735 0.618 0.415 0.365 0.949 0.641 0.997
Notes: This table reports the estimates of  a generalised method of moments two-steps difference panel regressions (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Robust standard errors 
in parenthesis . ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Panel Generalised Method of Moments, First Differences
Liquidity Capital
ldratio wholesale tier1 rbc
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Table 5: Universal and global business model 
 
 
 
  
ro
a
ro
e
z-
sc
o
re
ln
p
a
n
p
a_
ta
ld
ra
ti
o
 
w
h
o
le
sa
le
ti
er
1
rb
c
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
L
ag
ge
d
 d
ep
en
d
en
t
0
.1
4
8
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
1
4
)
-0
.0
1
8
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
(0
.1
0
6
)
0
.4
4
1
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
1
7
)
0
.2
7
9
*
  
(0
.1
4
6
)
0
.6
6
0
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
5
1
)
1
.2
1
2
*
*
*
 
(0
.0
2
9
)
0
.5
7
2
*
*
*
  
(0
.1
6
8
)
0
.3
9
0
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
1
5
)
-0
.0
3
6
  
(0
.1
3
3
)
U
B
I
1
.8
3
0
*
*
*
  
(0
.3
9
6
)
1
2
4
.2
5
2
*
*
*
  
 
(4
3
.7
9
9
)
6
.3
5
3
*
*
*
  
(2
.3
5
1
)
-5
.2
4
5
*
*
  
(2
.6
9
7
)
-1
5
.9
9
2
*
*
*
  
(3
.5
4
1
)
-1
.7
1
5
*
*
*
  
(0
.3
7
0
)
1
9
.7
3
2
  
(1
3
.9
4
3
)
3
1
.6
1
1
*
*
*
  
(1
1
.3
4
)
1
5
.2
4
9
*
*
  
(7
.4
9
6
)
fo
re
ig
n
 a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
0
.8
8
0
*
*
*
  
(0
.1
3
2
)
-2
1
.5
2
1
  
 
(1
9
.0
5
8
)
6
.4
8
3
*
*
*
  
 
(2
.0
9
0
)
6
.0
2
4
*
*
  
 
(2
.4
2
1
)
6
.0
2
8
*
*
  
 
(2
.7
4
9
)
0
.2
2
7
  
(0
.3
0
6
)
-1
9
.8
9
5
*
*
  
(9
.9
5
6
)
0
.7
0
2
  
(6
.6
0
6
)
-2
.4
9
7
  
(6
.8
3
3
)
U
B
I*
fo
re
ig
n
 a
ct
iv
it
ie
s
2
.4
0
0
*
*
*
  
(0
..
6
0
9
)
-1
1
9
.1
8
1
  
 
(7
9
.0
3
6
)
-2
2
.4
4
4
*
*
*
  
(4
.0
6
1
)
1
8
.4
2
6
*
*
  
(8
.0
7
1
)
-8
.4
2
6
  
(5
.1
5
5
)
5
.9
9
2
*
*
*
  
(0
.8
6
9
)
-5
5
.1
3
9
  
(3
7
.9
8
3
)
-3
6
.9
4
6
*
*
*
 
(1
2
.9
3
0
)
-1
.5
1
4
  
(1
7
.1
3
6
)
ro
a
-
-
1
.7
3
1
*
*
*
  
(0
.2
7
2
)
-0
.1
2
5
  
(0
.2
9
4
)
-0
.5
8
7
*
*
*
  
(0
.1
4
2
)
-0
.1
4
2
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
1
9
)
0
.7
1
9
  
 
(1
.3
0
7
)
1
.0
7
6
*
*
  
(0
.5
3
8
)
1
.2
1
7
*
  
(0
.7
0
5
)
le
v
er
ag
e
-0
.0
2
2
*
*
*
 
(0
.0
0
2
)
-0
.6
2
2
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
(0
.7
9
1
)
-0
.0
0
1
  
(0
.0
1
2
)
-0
.0
0
1
  
(0
.0
0
3
)
0
.0
0
1
  
(0
.0
0
9
)
-0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
0
0
)
0
.0
0
1
  
 
(0
.0
2
0
)
0
.0
0
5
  
 
(0
.0
2
0
)
-0
.0
0
7
  
 
(0
.0
2
1
)
rb
c
0
.0
4
3
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
0
7
)
-0
.0
3
0
 
(0
.8
2
0
)
0
.4
6
7
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
6
1
)
-0
.0
4
1
  
(0
.0
7
6
)
-0
.1
1
6
*
  
(0
.0
6
9
)
0
.0
2
3
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
0
4
)
-1
.2
2
5
*
*
*
  
(0
.4
6
7
)
-
-
n
im
0
.3
5
3
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
6
7
)
-1
.1
8
0
  
(3
.3
3
1
)
-0
.5
8
3
  
(0
.7
2
9
)
2
.0
0
4
*
*
*
  
(0
.6
5
5
)
-0
.6
8
1
*
*
*
  
(0
.1
7
9
)
0
.0
6
0
*
*
  
(0
.0
2
8
)
-2
.6
5
9
  
(2
.1
6
7
)
-4
.3
7
2
*
*
*
  
(0
.8
4
2
)
-2
.8
4
2
*
*
  
(1
.2
8
8
)
si
ze
0
.0
0
3
  
(0
.0
0
5
)
-0
.3
2
4
  
 
(0
.7
8
9
)
0
.2
3
3
  
(0
.2
4
5
)
0
.0
2
2
  
 
(0
.0
5
2
)
-0
.0
0
1
  
(0
.2
3
7
)
0
.0
4
4
*
*
  
(0
.0
1
8
)
0
.8
3
1
  
 
(1
.1
1
6
)
1
.8
8
3
  
(4
.5
8
4
)
-0
.7
7
8
  
(0
.6
5
4
)
ln
p
a
-0
.3
6
2
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
2
6
)
-4
.0
6
6
*
*
*
  
(1
.3
5
6
)
-1
.5
0
8
*
*
*
  
(0
.1
6
3
)
-
-
-0
.0
9
3
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
1
1
)
1
.2
0
5
  
 
(1
.6
2
7
)
0
.9
6
3
  
(0
.5
9
6
)
2
.3
9
3
*
*
*
  
(0
.7
7
2
)
lo
an
s
0
.0
8
2
  
(0
.1
0
8
)
-9
.3
8
9
*
 
(5
.2
1
6
)
0
.1
7
0
  
(0
.7
7
6
)
3
.9
4
4
*
*
*
  
(0
.8
5
3
)
0
.5
6
3
  
 
(0
.4
1
7
)
-
-0
.3
0
7
  
(3
.2
9
3
)
-7
.8
4
9
*
*
  
 
(3
.5
2
5
)
0
.1
3
1
  
 
(2
.7
0
3
)
d
ep
o
si
ts
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
0
3
)
-0
.0
4
9
  
(0
.2
4
2
)
0
.2
0
9
*
*
*
  
 
(0
.0
2
7
)
0
.0
7
2
*
*
  
 
(0
.0
2
9
)
0
.0
9
7
*
*
*
  
 
(0
.0
2
0
)
-
-
0
.0
5
9
  
(0
.1
3
6
)
0
.1
1
1
  
 
(0
.0
7
5
)
Δ
G
D
P
-0
.0
0
4
  
(0
.0
0
6
)
0
.0
0
1
  
(0
.3
3
9
)
-0
.6
6
7
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
9
7
)
-0
.0
8
7
  
(0
.0
7
7
)
-0
.0
8
5
*
*
  
(0
.0
3
9
)
-0
.0
1
7
*
*
*
  
(0
.0
0
3
)
-0
.5
9
7
  
 
(0
.3
6
2
)
-1
.7
2
2
*
*
*
  
(0
.5
8
0
)
-0
.2
1
7
*
  
(0
.1
8
0
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
2
8
5
3
5
1
3
9
5
3
8
4
4
2
7
4
9
8
3
9
5
2
2
7
3
8
9
J-
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s,
 p
-v
al
u
e
0
.3
9
2
0
.4
5
0
0
.7
8
8
0
.7
9
2
0
.6
6
6
0
.5
6
0
0
.1
5
1
0
.6
9
8
0
.4
0
5
A
R
(2
) 
te
st
 p
-v
al
u
e
0
.0
7
0
7
0
.9
5
2
0
.9
8
4
0
.6
0
6
0
.9
8
0
0
.1
9
3
0
.3
5
5
0
.9
5
9
0
.8
4
6
N
o
te
s:
 T
h
is
 t
a
b
le
 r
e
p
o
rt
s 
th
e
 e
st
im
a
te
s 
o
f 
 a
 g
e
n
e
ra
lis
e
d
 m
e
th
o
d
 o
f 
m
o
m
e
n
ts
 t
w
o
-s
te
p
s 
d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
 p
a
n
e
l 
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s 
(A
re
lla
n
o
 a
n
d
 B
o
n
d
, 
1
9
9
1
).
 R
o
b
u
st
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 e
rr
o
rs
 i
n
 p
a
re
n
th
e
si
s 
. 
*
*
*
,*
*
,*
 
re
fe
r 
to
 1
%
, 
5
%
 a
n
d
 1
0
%
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
c
e
 l
e
v
e
ls
, 
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
ly
.P
a
n
el
 G
en
er
a
li
se
d
 M
et
h
o
d
 o
f 
M
o
m
en
ts
, 
F
ir
st
 D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s
L
iq
u
id
it
y
C
a
p
it
a
l
P
ro
fi
ta
b
il
it
y
S
ta
b
il
it
y
20 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
This paper has introduced a new measure for universal banking that better captures the 
actual modus operandi of a bank by accounting for the actual diversification in financial 
products provisions. When comparing this measure with non-interest income, very different 
patterns arise. More specifically, banks with similar noninterest income share depict different 
degrees of activity diversification, implying structurally unlike business models.  
Regression analyses point to different implications for banking profitability, stability, 
liquidity and capitalisation arising from using our alternative metric. The two proxies have 
diverse effects on financial stability and capitalisation. In particular, when noninterest income 
share is used as proxy for the universal banking, it has either an adverse or no effect on financial 
stability. However, when the UBI is used to proxy for universal banking there is evidence that 
a higher degree diversification increases financial stability. Banks having a more diversified 
business model, as proxied by the UBI, are also better capitalised, as opposed to banks with 
high noninterest income share.  
In an attempt to capture a more complex business model, we consider the implications 
of a universal business model with a global reach. Regression estimates suggest that the higher 
the degree of complexity the higher the financial fragility. Although this more complex 
business model is associated with a significant and higher return on assets, it depicts lower 
liquidity as measured by the loan-to-deposit ratio and lower tier 1 capital ratio. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1.A: UBI by country, averages 
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Figure 1.A (continued): UBI by country, averages 
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Figure 1.A (continued): UBI by country, averages 
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TABLE 1.A: Banks contained in the sample 
 
Bank name Country Bank name Country
Bank of Australia Australia Intesa Sanpaolo Italy
Bendigo Australia Mediobanca Italy
Commonwealth bank Australia Unicredit Italy
Macquaire Australia Unione di Banche Italy
Queensland Australia Chiba Japan
Suncorp Australia Daiwa Japan
Westrpac Australia Mitsubishi Japan
BankTirol Austria Mizuho Japan
Erste Austria Shinkin Japan
Heta Austria Sumitomo Japan
Immigon Austria Nomura Japan 
Immofinanz Austria Norinchukin Japan 
Kontrollbank Austria Resona Japan 
Landensbank Austria Yokohoma Japan 
Oberbank Austria ABNAmro Netherlands
Raiffeissen Austria ING Netherlands
Dexia Belgium BancoBPI Portugal
KBC Belgium BancoCommercial Portugal
Bank of Montreal Canada BancoEspirito Portugal
Canadian Western Canada Banif Portugal
Dominion Canada Banco Bilbao Spain 
Imperial Bank Canada Banco de Sandabell Spain 
Laurentian Canada Bankiter Spain 
National Bank of Canada Canada Liberbank Spain 
Nova Scotia Canada Santander Spain 
Royal Bank Canada Nordea Sweden
Aktia Finland Skandinaviska Sweden
Alandsbanken Finland Svenka Sweden
Evli Finland Swedbank Sweden
BNP Paribas France Credit Swisse Switzerland
BPCE France Julius Baer Switzerland
Credit Agricole France UBS Switzerland
Credit Mutuel CIC France Vontobel Switzerland
Natixis France Barclays UK
Societe Generale SA France Cooperative UK
Commerzbank Germany HSBC UK
Deutsche Pfandbriefbank Germany Lloyds UK
DZ Bank Germany Nationwide UK
Landersbank Germany RBS UK
Aareal Germany Standard Chartered UK
Deutsche bank Germany Bancorp US
Rentenbank Germany Bank of America US
Attica Greece Capitalone US
Eurobank Greece Citigroup US
Allied Ireland Goldman US
Permanent Ireland Morgan Stanley US
Banca Monte Italy NYMellon US
Banca Popolare RomagnaItaly PNC US
Banca Popolare SC Italy State Street US
Banco Popolare Milan Italy WellsFargo US
Banco Popolare Vicenza Italy JPMorgan US
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TABLE 2.A: UBI and Foreign exposure share construction 
 
Bank UBI Foreign assets share
Aareal Bank AG Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
ABN AMRO Group NV Total Assets Based on foreign share of net revenues
Aktia Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Alandsbanken Total Assets Based on foreign share of net revenues
Allied Irish Banks Total Assets Based on foreign share of net revenues
Attica Bank SA Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Spa Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna SC Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Banca Popolare SC Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Banco Bilbao SA Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Banco BPI Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Banco Comercial Portugues Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Banco de Sandabell Net Revenues NA
Banco Espirito Santo SA Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Banco Popolare di Milano Scarl Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Banco Popolare Vicenza Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Banco Santander Sa Net Revenues Based on foreign share of assets
BANIF Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Bank fuer Tirol und Vorarlberg AG Net Revenues Based on foreign share of assets
Bank of America Corp Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Bank of Montreal Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Bank of New York Mellon Corp Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Bank of Novia Scotia Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net income
Bank of Queensland Ltd Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Bankiter Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Barclays PLC Total Assets Based on foreign share of net revenues
Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
BNP Paribas SA Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Canadian Western Bank Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Capital One Financial Corp Net Revenues Based on foreign share of assets
Chiba Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Citigroup Inc Total Assets Based on foreign share of net revenues
Commerzbank Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Total Assets Based on foreign share of revenues
Co-operative Bank PLC Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Credit Agricole SA Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Credit Mutuel-CIC Group Total Assets Based on foreign share of revenues
Credit Suisse Group AG Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Daiwa Revenue Based on foreign share of assets
Deutsche bank Total Assets Based on foreign share of net revenues
Deutsche Pfandbriefbank Net Revenues NA
Dexia SA Total Assets Based on foreign share of revenues
DZ Bank AG Deutsche Zentral-GenossenschaftsbankTotal Assets NA
Erste Group Bank AG Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Eurobank Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Evli Net Revenues Based on foreign share of assets
Goldman Sachs Group Inc Total Assets Based on foreign share of revenues
Groupe BPCE Operating Income NA
Heta Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
HSBC Holdings PLC Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
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TABLE 2.A (continued): UBI and Foreign exposure share construction 
 
Bank UBI Foreign assets share
Immigon Portfolioabbau AG Total Assets Based on foreign share of net revenues
Immofinanz AG Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
ING Groep NV Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Intesa Sanpaolo Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Julius Baer Group Ltd Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
JP Morgan Chase Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
KBC Groep NV Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Laurentian Bank of Canada Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
LBBW Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Liberbank Total Assets NA
Lloyds Banking Group PLC Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Macquarie Group Ltd Total Assets Based on foreign share of revenues
Mediobanca Spa Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc Total Assets Based on foreign share of revenues
Mizuho Financial Group Total Assets Based on foreign share of revenues
Morgan Stanley Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
National Australia Bank Ltd Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
National Bank of Canada Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Nationwide Building Society Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Natixis SA Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Nomura Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Nordea Bank AB Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Norinchukin Bank Total Assets Based on foreign share of revenues
Oberbank AG Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG Total Assets NA
Permanent TSB Group Holdings Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
PNC Financial Services Group Inc Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Raiffeisen Bank International AG Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Resona Holdings Inc Net Revenues Based on foreign share of net revenues
Royal Bank of Canada Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Shinkin Central Bank Total Assets Based on foreign share of revenues
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Societe Generale SA Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Standard Chartered PLC Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
State Street Corp Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets under management
Sumitomo Mitsui Financil Group Inc Revenues Based on foreign share of revenues
Suncorp Group Ltd Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Svenska Handelsbanken AB Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Swedbank AB Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Swiss Life Holding AG Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Toronto-Dominion Bank Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
UBS Group AG Total Assets Based on foreign share of net revenues
UniCredit Spa Net Revenues Based on foreign share of assets
Unione di Banche Italiane Spa Net Revenues Based on foreign share of assets
US Bancorp Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Vontobel Holding AG Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Wells Fargo & Co Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
Westpac Banking Corp Total Assets Based on foreign share of revenues
Yokohoma Total Assets Based on foreign share of assets
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TABLE 3.A summary statistics 
 
 
Variable description Notation  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Observations
Assets-to-equity leverage 18.037 17.273 41.635 -29.089 915.402 1066
Deposits-to-assets*100 deposit 47.570 48.706 20.132 -0.118 2.319 1049
Foreign assets-to-total assets foreign activities 0.250 0.201 0.254 0.413 4.699 858
GDP growth rate, annual ΔGDP 1.157 1.688 2.369 -1.210 4.944 1098
Loans-to-deposits ldratio 1.291 1.136 1.115 7.254 87.525 1022
Log of non-performing assets lnpa 7.217 7.822 2.933 -1.138 4.034 834
Log of total assets size 11.644 12.157 2.422 -1.087 3.722 1097
Log of total loans loans 11.221 11.758 2.138 -2.098 9.409 867
Net interest margin nim 1.951 1.549 3.956 19.984 464.862 1044
Non-deposit liabilities-to-total assets*100 wholesale 52.430 51.294 20.132 0.118 2.319 1049
Noninteret income-to-total income NonInterest 0.382 0.461 2.706 -30.028 940.849 1067
Nonperforming assets-to-total assets npa_a 2.352 0.898 4.071 3.528 17.474 913
Return on assets roa 0.361 0.482 1.503 -17.792 448.550 1045
Return on common equity roe 6.994 8.866 15.791 -4.160 33.272 1034
Risk-based capital ratio crb 14.374 13.500 3.789 1.404 5.413 978
Tier 1 capital ratio, risk-based tier1 11.653 10.900 6.839 13.216 244.447 987
UBI UBI 0.375 0.397 0.216 -0.143 2.385 995
Z-score z-score 21.744 15.994 19.081 2.439 13.081 1053
